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“Mark my words” -  
Trademarks and Fundamental Rights in the EU1 
Professor, dr.jur., PhD Jens Schovsbo University of Copenhagen, Center for 
Information and Innovation Law (CIIR) 
 
Abstract. This paper analyses the new provision in EU law that trademark rules 
should be “applied in a way that ensures full respect for fundamental rights and 
freedoms, and in particular the freedom of expression”. It is first pointed out that the 
new provisions are part of a broader trend of ‘constitiutionalization’ in EU law whereby 
courts rely on fundamental rights norms when they interpret the rules of IPR. It is 
shown how this approach differs from the traditional approach according to which the 
two legal systems did not interact on the level of substantive law. After a presentation of 
the legislative background for the changes and the development in copyright law the 
likely impact of the changes in law is discussed. It is concluded that even though the 
constitutionalization is not going to revolutionize trademark law, it may well accelerate 
an evolution of EU trademark law and make it more receptive towards augments from 
users’ of trade marks.   
1. Introduction 
When the EU rules on trademarks were recently amended a new provision was added 
to the Recitals: Trademark rules should be “applied in a way that ensures full respect 
for fundamental rights and freedoms, and in particular the freedom of expression.”2  
On the face of it, there is nothing surprising in this. Of course, trademark law has 
never been above or beyond the reach of fundamental rights such as the Free Speech.3 
                                                          
1 This paper is based on my talk at UC Irvine on October 28th 2016 and benefited from the comments I 
received at that occasion. Thanks to Thomas Riis and Knud Wallberg (CIIR) for comments on an earlier 
draft and to Berdien van der Donk for research assistance.   
2 Regulation (EU) 2015/2424 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2015 
amending Council Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 on the Community trademark and Commission 
Regulation (EC) No 2868/95 implementing Council Regulation (EC) No 40/94 on the Community 
trademark, and repealing Commission Regulation (EC) No 2869/95 on the fees payable to the Office for 
Harmonization in the Internal Market (Trademarks and Designs), OJ L 341 of 24 December 2015 p. 21–
94 (‘Trademark Regulation’ or ‘Regulation’) point 21 and Directive (EU) 2015/2436 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2015 to approximate the laws of the Member States 
relating to trademarks OJ L 336 of 23 December 2015, p. 1–26 (‘Trademark Directive’ or ‘Directive’), 
point 27. 
3 For the following, I take “fundamental rights” to include those rights and freedoms which are 
recognized in the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) (Formally called the Convention for 
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms), available e.g. at 
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Looking closer, however, it becomes clear that the explicit mentioning of fundamental 
rights is part of a broader and more fundamental reconfiguration in EU law of the 
interface between Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) and fundamental rights. This not 
only affects the way courts decide conflicts involving IPR and the kinds of arguments 
they consider as relevant. It also has normative implication.  
This contribution describes the legal background for the new provisions and tries to 
predict its effects on future case law from the Court of Justice of the European Union 
(CJEU) and courts in EU countries. It first describes how EU law has dealt with the 
interface between IPR and fundamental rights so far and then zooms in on trademark 
law.4 It will be pointed out, how the new provisions are part of a general trend towards 
a reliance by courts of fundamental rights norms in IPR cases (i.e. the 
constitiutionalization) and that the recitals are most likely going to accelerate this 
trend. The constitutionalization is not going to revolutionize trademark law but it will 
be argued that it might spark an evolution of EU trademark law and make it more 
receptive towards augments from users’ of trade marks.   
2. IPR and Fundamental Rights 
Traditionally, fundamental rights and IPR have been seen as sharing the same goals 
and values. Thus, the US Supreme Court in Harper & Row described copyright as an 
“engine of free expression”5 and the EU-Charter simply states that “Intellectual 
                                                          
http://www.echr.coe.int/pages/home.aspx?p=basictexts and in particular the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights of the European Union (EU Charter), Official Journal C 326 of 26 October 2012, p. 391–407. By 
way of  example the Charter includes the following provisions: Article 8 Protection of personal data; 
Article 10 Freedom of thought, conscience and religion; Article 11 Freedom of expression and 
information; Article 13 Freedom of the arts and sciences; Article 16 Freedom to conduct a business; 
Article 17 Right to property; Article 48 Presumption of innocence and right of defence and Article 54 
Prohibition of abuse of rights. 
4 For a general introduction see the excellent collection Geiger C (ed.) Research Handbook on Human 
Rights and Intellectual Property, Elgar 2015. For the EU-dimension I recommend in particular Mylly T, 
The constitutionalization of the European legal order, ibid. 103 – 131, Geiger C, ‘Constitutionalising’ 
Intellectual Property Law? The Influence of Fundamental Rights on Intellectual Property in the 
European Union, International Review of Intellectual Property and Competition Law 2006 37(4) 371-406 
and Griffiths J Constitutionalisation or harmonization? The Court of Justice, the right to property and 
European copyright law, E.L. Rev 2013, 38(1), 65-78. Specifically on trademarks see M Senftleben, 
”Free Signs and Free Use: How to Offer Room for Freedom of Expression within the Trademark 
System” in Geiger (ed) 354-376, M Senftleben et al., ” Recommendation on Measures to Safeguard 
Freedom of Expression and Undistorted Competition in EU Trade”, European Intellectual Property 
Review 2015, 337-344, and L Ramsey and J Schovsbo, ” Mechanisms for Limiting Trademark Rights to 
Further Competition and Free Speech”, International Review of Intellectual Property and Competition 
Law 2013 671 (SSRN https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2619436). 
5 US Supreme Ct., Harper & Row v National Enterprises, 471 US 539 (1958), 471 U.S. 539. 
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property shall be protected [as property]”6.7 Also IPR system itself is thought to 
balance the various societal interests including those specifically recognized via 
fundamental rights i.e. at the highest level in the hierarchy of legal norms. Trademark 
law has always done so in various ways. On the most general level, trademark law 
could be said to increase freedom of expression and information simply by expanding 
the “market in language”.8 More to the point, Martin Senftleben explains how the 
rules in EU trademark law which limit protection to only signs which are distinctive, 
impose a post registration use requirement on holders or which in other ways limit 
exclusivity promote a public domain which offers “a reservoir of unprotected and 
protected signs that are available for political, artistic and commercial speech”.9  
Despite of the communalities between the two areas of law, there is little interference 
or room for interaction at the level of substantive law. Helfer and Austin thus report 
how fundamental rights and IPR have traditionally been preoccupied with their own 
distinct concerns and have not seen the other as either adding or threatening its 
sphere or influence or opportunities for expansion.10 By way of example they point out 
how the mother of all IPR’s (internal) limitations and exceptions11 i.e. the three-step-
test originating in the Berne Convention12 contains no references to fundamental 
                                                          
6 Article 17(2). The right to property is stated in article 17(1): “Everyone has the right to own, use, 
dispose of and bequeath his or her lawfully acquired possessions. No one may be deprived of his or her 
possessions, except in the public interest and in the cases and under the conditions provided for by law, 
subject to fair compensation being paid in good time for their loss. The use of property may be regulated 
by law in so far as is necessary for the general interest.” As pointed out by C Geiger, Intellectual 
property shall be protected!? Article 17(2) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union: 
a mysterious provision with an unclear scope.(Editorial), European Intellectual Property Review, March, 
2009, Vol.31(3), p.113-117 it is important to bear in mind that the protection of IPR is not “absolute” but 
according to subparagraph 1 may be limited and regulated in the “public”/”general” interest. 
7 See also the Universal Declaration on Human Rights, Article 27(2): “Everyone has the right to the 
protection of the moral and material interests resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic 
production of which he is the author” and International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights of 16 December 1966, Article 15(1)(c): “The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the 
right of everyone: To benefit from the protection of the moral and material interests resulting from any 
scientific, literary or artistic production of which he is the author”. 
8 Landes, William M. and Posner, Richard A. Trademark Law: An Economic Perspective,  
The Journal of Law & Economics, (1987) Vol. 30, No. 2 265-309 271 (noting also that these benefits are 
small).   
9 Senftleben supra 355. 
10 Helfer L R and Austin G W, Human Rights and Intellectual Property – Mapping the Global Interface, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2011, 34. At 31 et seq. the authors point out how this starting 
point is “curious” given the fact that the close relationship between IPR and human rights has been 
spelled out clearly in basic international legal instruments e.g. those mentioned supra note 4. 
11 Like Kur A, “Limitations and exceptions under the three-step test – how much room to walk the 
middle ground” 208 -261 in Kur A and Levin M Intellectual Property Rights in a Fair World Trade 
System, Edward Elgar 2011, 212 I take these two expressions to be interchangeable. 
12 Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works (as amended on September 28, 
1979, available at http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/details.jsp?id=12214, article 9(2) 
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rights.13 As seen from a traditional perspective, this is hardly surprising given that 
the international IPR treaties are based on the concept of minimum protection and are 
not primarily concerned with the way these rights are limited or function within the 
national systems vis-a-vis the nationals of the state.14 At the same time, it reflects a 
two-pillar view of IPR and fundamental rights. 
2.1. IPR and Fundamental Rights in the EU 
In recent years, the starting point described supra has become blurred and the two 
areas of the law are becoming more and more aware of each other (paraphrasing 
Helfer and Austin). At the international level, the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade 
Agreement (ACTA) for example expressly states that the enforcement procedures 
should be implemented in a manner that “avoids the creation of barriers to legitimate 
activity, including electronic commerce, and, consistent with that Party’s law, 
preserves fundamental principles such as freedom of expression, fair process, and 
privacy”.15 Even though that Agreement has not so far entered into force, it reflects an 
attempt to combine the two systems in a way which is very different when compared 
to the traditional IPR-conventions.16 A similar trend is visible in Europe. Beginning in 
national case law17 the CJEU has in more recent cases been drawing on (external) 
constitutional norms when interpreting IPR legislation including the internal 
balancing norms such as exceptions and limitations.18  In this way, it is becoming clear 
                                                          
13 Blomqvist J, Primer on International Copyright and Related Rights, Edward Elgar 2014, 182 
interestingly points out how the three-step-test in the Berne Convention mirrors Article 4 of the  
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights of 16 December 1966 which was 
adopted just a year previous to the 1967-revision of the Berne Convention which introduced the three-
step-test. The framers of the Berne Convention were thus very much aware of the development in 
fundamental rights law and the lack of cross-references, therefore, should be seen as a deliberate choice. 
14 Blomqvist, ibid. 17 and Kur, supra note 11, 216 et seq. 
15 Article 27(2) italics added. The text is available e.g. at https://ustr.gov/acta. 
16 In the same vein, see the Marrakesh Treaty to Facilitate Access to Published Works for Persons Who 
Are Blind, Visually Impaired or Otherwise Print Disabled (2013) (e.g. the first recital of the Preamble 
(“Recalling the principles of non-discrimination, equal opportunity, accessibility and full and effective 
participation and inclusion in society, proclaimed in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and 
the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities), available at 
http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/details.jsp?id=13169. 
17 For example Ramsey L and Schovsbo J supra note 4, Rahmatian A, “Trademarks and Human Rights”, 
in: Torremans P (ed.), 18 Intellectual Property and Human Rights 335, 349-350 (Kluwer Law 
International, 2008) and Weckström K, “The Lawfulness of Criticizing Big Business - Comparing 
Approaches to the Balancing of Societal Interests Behind Trademark Protection”, 11 Lewis & Clark L. 
Rev. 671 (2007). 
18 Similarly, in EU-competition law which Advocate General Jääskinen has called “EU’s economic 
constitution”, Opinion delivered on 11 December 2014 in Case C-352/13 Cartel Damage Claims (CDC) 
with further references. According to the case law of the CJEU, competition law may be relied upon as 
the basis for compulsory licenses of IPR but only in exceptional circumstances, see Judgment  of the  
CJEU of 29 April 2004 Case C-418/01 (IMS Health) point 38 and Judgment of the CJEU  of 6 April 1995 
C-241/91 P and C-242/91 P (Magill) and e.g. Schovsbo J, Fire and water make steam – redefining the 
role of competition law in TRIPS 308-358 in Kur A and Levin M (ed.) Intellectual Property Rights in A 
Fair World Trade System, Elgar 2011 345 .    
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that even though there are still walls between IPR and fundamental rights the walls 
are found within the same house and doors exist (and opens both ways) to allow the 
passage of legal norms and arguments from one legal system to the other.   
The full ramifications of this process – aptly coined as the constitutionalization of IPR 
by Geiger19  – remain to be seen but already the shift has challenged traditional 
positions in IPR. For copyright (see more infra) the European Copyright Society has 
thus reported that the CJEU in the Deckmyn-decision by linking the (internal) 
limitation in copyright for parodies directly to the (external) Right to Freedom of 
Expression implicitly rejected the traditional continental European view of limitations 
and exceptions as being “restrictively delineated”20. According to this Opinion, the 
reasoning of the CJEU instead reflects the case law of the European Court of Human 
Rights (based on the ECHR) that any exception to the right to freedom of expression 
including copyright must itself be interpreted narrowly.21 Thus the constitutional-
based reading of the limitations and exceptions turns the analysis upside-down: If one 
sees exclusivity as the exception (and not as the main rule) then the limitation (which 
(re)introduces the freedom of information prohibited by exclusivity) represents the 
base line.22 As seen from such a perspective it is thus not possible to indicate a general 
principle of interpretation in favour of the main rule since it is not a priori clear, 
which is the main rule (exclusivity or freedom of information). Consequently, the 
constitutionalization provides courts with arguments that may affect their application 
of the law de lega lata.  
In the most recent phase of EU harmonization (see infra), the traditional lines 
between IPR and fundamental rights have become even more blurred. This 
contribution focuses on the new trademark Regulation and Directive but similar 
provisions are found in the recently adopted Directive on trade secrets23 and the 
                                                          
19 Geiger, supra note 4. 
20 Judgement of the CJEU of 3 September 2014, Case C-201/13, Johan Deckmyn and Vrijheidsfonds 
VZW v Helena Vandersteen and Others, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2132. Geiger C et al., Limitations and 
Exceptions as Key Elements of the Legal Framework for Copyright in the European Union – Opinion on 
the Judgment of the CJEU in Case C-201/13 Deckymn, International Review of Intellectual Property 
and Competition Law (2015) 46(3) 93-101 point 23-27. Generally on the European traditional style of 
interpretation see Senftleben M, Copyright, Limitations and the Three-Step Test – An Analysis of the 
Three-Step Test in International and EC Copyright Law, Kluwer 2004 6 (on copyright).  
21 Geiger et al., ibid.  
22 Schovsbo J, Constitutional Foundations and Constitutionalization of IP Law - A Tale of Different 
Stories? [2015] ZGE/IPJ 7 1-12. 
23 Directive (EU) 2016/943 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2016 on the 
protection of undisclosed know-how and business information (trade secrets) against their unlawful 
acquisition, use and disclosure, OJ L 157 of 15 June 2016, p. 1–18 (in particular point 19: “While this 
Directive provides for measures and remedies which can consist of preventing the disclosure of 
information in order to protect the confidentiality of trade secrets, it is essential that the exercise of the 
right to freedom of expression and information which encompasses media freedom and pluralism, as 
reflected in Article 11 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (‘the Charter’), not 
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proposal for a new copyright Directive24.25 Fundamental rights in other words, are 
becoming internalized into EU IPR and will, therefore, constitute an explicitly 
integrated part of the IPR legislative system. For this reason, courts will not just rely 
on fundamental rights only in exceptional cases where the internal balancing tools fall 
short. Instead, courts are going to rely on such norms in all instances. The precise 
effects of this development are hard to predict. Few trademark cases involve a clash 
between trademark exclusivity and – say – artistic freedom of expression. In addition, 
trademark law has traditionally had tools to factor free speech and other fundamental 
rights into the application of trademarks provisions on exclusivity. Arguably, these 
tools have generally been effective in striking the right balance. By way of example it 
was hardly a coincidence that in the much-reported Dutch case Louis Vuitton relied on 
EU design law and not on trade mar law to try to prevent the Danish artist Nadia 
Plesner from using their design/trade mark as part of an artwork (called Simple 
Living).26 It would seem to have been clear from the outset, that such use did not fall 
foul of trademark law. Still the fact the EU trademark law has not till now explicitly 
recognized the interest of users such as Nadia Plesner does imply a certain element of 
                                                          
be restricted, in particular with regard to investigative journalism and the protection of journalistic 
sources”). 
24 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on copyright in the Digital 
Single Market, COM(2016) 593 final, notably p 4 and the Proposed Directive points 45 (“This Directive 
respects the fundamental rights and observes the principles recognized in particular by the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union. Accordingly, this Directive should be interpreted and 
applied in accordance with those 
rights and principles”) and point 46 (“Any processing of personal data under this Directive should 
respect fundamental rights, including the right to respect for private and family life and the right to 
protection of personal data under Articles 7 and 8 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
European Union and must be in compliance with Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of 
the Council and Directive 2002/58/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council” (footnotes 
omitted). 
25 See for an early example, the Judgment of the CJEU of 9 October 2001, case C-377/98, Kingdom of 
the Netherlands v European Parliament and Council of the European Union, ECLI:EU:C:2001:329 on 
Directive 98/44/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 July 1998 on the legal protection 
of biotechnological inventions OJ L 213 of 30 July 1998, p. 13–21 (Biotech-Directive) (in particular para. 
70: “It is for the Court of Justice, in its review of the compatibility of acts of the institutions with the 
general principles of Community law, to ensure that the fundamental right to human dignity and 
integrity is observed”). 
26 Judgement of the District Court of The Hague of 4 May 2011, 389526/KG ZA 11-294, Nadia Plesner Joensen v Louis 
Vuitton Malletier SA, ECLI:NL:RBSGR:2011:BQ3525. Unofficial translation (with pictures) available at 
http://www.nadiaplesner.com/upl/website/simple-living--darfurnica1/VerdictEnglish.pdf. The court balanced the 
fundamental right of Louis Vuitton to peacefully enjoy its property right (i.e. design right) against  the use of the design 
and the artist’s protection with regard to her artistic freedom. The court found that the artist was allowed to use LV’s 
design of a multicolour canvas as applied to one of its own expensive handbags as part of a drawing called Simple Living 
where the LV-bag was being carried by a malnourished African child (together with a ‘Paris Hilton-dog’). By the same 
token, even the use of the same drawing as the motive on a T-shirt was allowed for under design law. The artist explained 
that the bag was used as a symbol and as part of an attempt to draw attention to what she believed was a problematic 
difference in attention given to celebrities and to the famine, which was going on in Darfur. See in particular the Judgment 
point 4.8. See on the case L. Guilbaut, The Netherlands: Darfurnica, Miffy and the right to parody!, 3 JIPITEC, 236 
(2011) and J. McCutcheon, Designs, Parody and Artistic Expression – A Comparative Perspective of Plesner v Louis 
Vuitton, Monash Univ. L Rev. Vol 41 No 1 (2015). 
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doubt which could be relied upon by aggressive rights holders to push exclusivity 
beyond its limits. This may have a freeze effects on artistic use which involves trade 
marks. Furthermore, the societal costs of such a freeze for artistic and cultural 
development have no doubt been growing in recent years. The same factors which 
have made trademarks more and more important as communicative tools for 
companies have thus increased their importance for users who for various reasons 
need access to use someone else’s trademark in order to engage in activities which are 
generally recognized as being beneficial to society. Users in this sense include a 
disparate group and their interest may be driven be different motives. As seen from a 
cultural perspective artists have for long used trademarks as part of their artwork 
(just think of Andy Warhole’s Campbell's Soup Cans27 or James Bond’s well-known 
fondness for Bollinger champagne). Political use includes satirical uses such as when a 
non-governmental-organisation (ngo) wants to criticise the oil company and uses 
E$$O28 or the use by an anti-smoking organization of a parody of a Marlboro 
advertisement to bring across an antismoking message29. Commercially access to some 
one else’s trade mark may be necessary in order to simply present one’s own products 
as alternatives (“If you like ‘brand X’ you’d love my brand too”) or to indicate their use 
(“this part fits with ‘brand X’”).  Importantly, the scope of fundamental rights norms in 
the EU is very broad and goes beyond traditional civil rights such as free speech (e.g. 
use to express criticism, parodies or reviews). EU law also recognizes e.g. the Freedom 
to conduct a business as a fundamental right.30 In this way, a broad variety of users 
are potentially able to defend themselves against from trademark holders by 
arguments based on fundamental rights. Adding to the blurring of the inter face 
between fundamental rights and IPR is, therefore, a certain Trojan horse-quality of 
the reference to “fundamental rights”. Not only is the concept very wide. In addition, 
the boundaries for the individual rights and freedoms are constantly evolving and they 
develop often via case law, which is totally unrelated to IPR.  
3. EU harmonization of trademark law  
 
3.1. Generally 
The EU legal order has found it hard to deal with trademarks. A first round 
harmonization blew through trademark law (and indeed IPR in general) in the 1970’s 
and 1980s. During this process the Court of Justice of the European Community (what 
                                                          
27 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Campbell's_Soup_Cans 
28 Based on the Judgment of the Court of Appeal Paris of 16 November 2005, Case C-04/12417, Esso Plc 
v Greenpeace France, reprinted in [2006] E.T.M.R. 53.  
29 Based on the Judgment of the German Federal Supreme Court of 17 April 1984, Case VI ZR 246/82, 
Marlboro v Mordoro, ECLI:DE:BGH:1984:170484UVIZR24682, reprinted in [1986] E.C.C. 1, 6-7.  
30 EU Charter article 16. 
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is now the CJEU) relied on the provisions in the (at the time binding) Treaty of Rome 
(primarily on the Free Movement of Goods) to eradicate restrictions to intra 
community trade arising from the territorial nature of the uncoordinated national 
protection schemes in place at the time. As notable results a principle of regional 
exhaustion (“first sale”)31 and a rocky relationship between EU (or as it were 
“European Community”) law and national laws according to which EC law would only 
restrict the exercise of national IPR but left the existence of those rights untouched32 
were established. In the subsequent and second round of harmonization in the late 
80’s and mid 90’s, common rules were passed targeting those aspects of national law 
which had been touched in the first round or which were otherwise limiting the 
effective working of the Internal Market. For trademark law this lead to the passing of 
the First Council Directive to approximate the laws of the Member States relating to 
trademarks in 198833 (1989-Directive) and the Regulation on Community trademarks 
in 199334 (1994-Regulation). The scope of the 1989-Directive was “limited to those 
national provisions of law which most directly affect the functioning of the internal 
market”35 and created an obligation for Member States to implement the provisions of 
the Directive in their national Trademark Acts.36 The Regulation created a free 
standing unitary right which was issued by a newly established transnational regional 
Trademark Office (“OHIM” (what is now the EUIPO))37 and enforced nationally via 
dedicated courts. As it will be seen in the following, the ongoing round of 
harmonization combines elements from the first two rounds and sees a continued 
active CJEU applying constitutional norms to interpret the directives and 
regulations.38 
 
                                                          
31 Judgments of the CJEU of 31 October 1974, Case C-15/74, Centrafarm v Sterling Drug, 
ECLI:EU:C:1974:114 (patents) and C-16/74, Centrafarm v Winthrop, ECLI:EU:C:1974:115 
(trademarks).  
32 E.g. Judgment of the CJEU of 3 July 1974, Case C-192/73, Van Zuylen frères v Hag AG. (HAG I), 
ECLI:EU:C:1974:72, paras 6-8 and 15. 
33 First Council Directive 89/104/EEC of 21 December 1988 to approximate the laws of the Member 
States relating to trademarks Official Journal L 40 of 11 February 1989 p 1. The directive was later 
amended and the official and codified version is now Directive 2008/95/EC of the European Parliament 
and of the Council of 22 October 2008 to approximate the laws of the Member States relating to 
trademarks (Codified version) Official Journal L 299 of 8 November 2008, p. 25–33. 
34 Council Regulation (EC) No 40/94 of 20 December 1993 on the Community trademark, Official 
Journal L 11 of 14 January 1994 p 1. 
35 First Council Directive 89/104/EEC, point 3. 
36 The new Directive also aims a providing a more comprehensive harmonization than the previous one 
and includes new aspects of procedural rules and has made some formerly facultative provision 
mandatory (notably the protection of marks with a reputation, infra), see 2015-Directive, points 8-14. 
37 General information at https://euipo.europa.eu/ohimportal/en. 
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3.2. The expansion of substantive trademark law 
As seen from a traditional trademark law perspective, the result of the harmonization 
in the 80s and 90s was an expansion of the reach and scope of trademark law and a 
strengthening of the legal position of trademark holders. By way of examples: The 
Regulation established an extra layer of cheap and readily available EC-wide 
protection based on a single application and administered by a benevolent new 
regional Trademark Office; new types of marks were recognized (including colours and 
the shape of goods); protection for marks with a reputation was granted even if no risk 
of confusion is involved; and a principle of regional exhaustion gave right holders new 
ways of restricting parallel importation of goods which had been put on the market for 
the first time by the trademark holder or with its consent in a non-EU country. 
In the ensuing case law, the main focus of the (as it later became) CJEU was “to 
prevent the protection afforded to the proprietor varying from one State to another” 
and “to eliminate disparities between the trademark laws of the Member States which 
may impede the free movement of goods and the freedom to provide services and 
distort competition within the common market”.39 In the same vein, it was stated that 
the rule on exhaustion embodied “a complete harmonization” of the regional principle 
as this was the only interpretation which was fully capable of ensuring that the 
purpose of the Directive is achieved, namely to safeguard the functioning of the 
internal market.40 Of course, the CJEU didn’t develop trademark law without any 
recognition of trademark law’s overall role as a part of the general legal system to 
protect “undistorted competition”41. In early decisions, the Court emphasized the 
public interest underlying the trademark provisions, which aimed at keeping 
descriptive signs or indications42 or signs consisting exclusively of the shape of the 
product necessary to obtain a technical result43 outside of trademark protection to be 
freely used by all. In important decisions the CJEU also indicated concern about the 
risks of extending trademark protection e.g. by making it clear that protection should 
not by itself confer “an unjustified advantage for a single trader”44 and that trademark 
                                                          
39 Judgment of the CJEU of 12 November 2002, Case C-206/01, Arsenal Football Club plc v Matthew 
Reed, ECLI:EU:C:2002:651, para 45 and 46. 
40 Judgment of the CJEU of 16 July 1998, Case C-355/96, Silhouette International Schmied GmbH & 
Co. KG v Hartlauer Handelsgesellschaft GmbH, ECLI:EU:C:1998:374, para 25-27. 
41 Judgment of the CJEU of 17 October 1990, case C-10/89, SA CNL-SUCAL NV v HAG GF AG (Hag II), 
ECLI:EU:C:1990:359, para. 13. 
42 Judgment of the CJEU of 4 May 1999, joined cases C-108/97, C-109/97, Windsurfing Chiemsee, 
ECLI:EU:C:1999:230, para. 25. 
43 Judgment of the CJEU of 18 June 2002, Case C-299/99P, Koninklijke Philips Electronics NV v 
Remington Consumer Products Ltd., ECLI:EU:C:2002:377, para 79. 
44 Judgment of the CJEU of 6 May 2003, Case C-104/01, Libertel Groep BV v Benelux Merkenbureau, 
ECLI:EU:C:2003:244, para 54. 
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law offers no protection “against practices inherent in competition”45. Still, the overall 
effect of the development of the CJEU’s practice was to the benefit of trademark 
holders.46 This also affected the way the limitations and exceptions were used. For 
example, in Gillette the ECJ was asked to decide if and to what extent the seller of 
non-original blades that fit Gillette’s razor handles could use the Gillette brands on its 
packaging. The seller argued its use of Gillette’s marks to indicate the product’s 
intended purpose was in accordance with “honest practices” and thus was permitted 
under Article 6 of the Directive.  The Court, however, interpreted the limitations in 
the Directive narrowly, stating that the “honest practices” requirement in Article 6 “in 
substance [constitutes] the expression of a duty to act fairly in relation to the 
legitimate interests of the trademark owner.”47 As I have argued elsewhere with Lisa 
Ramsey while the “honest practices” language thus could be perceived as permitting 
open-ended balancing of the interests of the mark holder, competitors, and the public 
in a trademark dispute, this interpretation of Article 6 in Gillette provides for one-
way-only flexibility to consider solely the interests of rights holders.48 The Gillette 
decision in this way illustrates how the gravitational forces of EU trademark law were 
tending to the trademark holders’ interests.49 The climax for this development 
arguably came in L’Oréal v. Bellure where the CJEU explained that the protected 
functions of a mark are not limited to the origin function, but include other functions 
such as “guaranteeing the quality of the goods or services in question and those of 
communication, investment, or advertising.”50 Even though the CJEU has so far relied 
on the functional analysis in a limited number of instances and only to restrict the 
scope of the so-called “double identity-“rule51 the broadness of the protected functions 
                                                          
45 Judgment of the CJEU of 22 September 2011, Case C-323/09, Interflora Inc., Interflora British Unit v 
Marks & Spencer plc. v Flowers Direct Online Ltd, ECLI:EU:C:2011:604, para 57. 
46 E.g. Senftleben, M, Trademark Protection – A Black Hole in the Intellectual Property Galaxy?, 
International Review of Intellectual Property and Competition Law (2011) 42:383-387 and Kur A, 
Trademarks Function, Don’t they? CJEU Juridprudence and Unfair Competition Principles, 
International Review of Intellectual Property and Competition Law (2014) 434 – 453. 
47 Judgment of the CJEU of 17 March 2005, Case C-228/03, the Gillette Company v. LA-Laboratories Ltd., 
ECLI:EU:C:2005:177, para. 49 with references. Italics added.   
48 See Ramsey and Schovsbo supra note 4 p. 676, with references also to the narrow interpretations by 
the CJEU of the statutory limitations in the Judgment of 25 January 2007, Case C-48/05, Adam Opel AG 
v. Autec, ECLI:EU:C:2007:55, para. 18, 22, and Judgment of 8 July 2010, Case C-558/08, Portakabin Ltd. 
v. Primakabin BV, ECLI:EU:C:2010:416.   
49 Ibid. 
50 Judgment of the CJEU of 18 June 2009, Case C-487/07, L’Óreál SA v. Bellure NV., 
ECLI:EU:C:2009:378, para. 58. The case and the functionality analysis has been widely debated e.g. Kur 
supra note 46 and Senftleben, Martin, Function theory and international exhaustion: why it is wise to 
confine the double identity rule in EU trademark law to cases affecting the origin function, European 
Intellectual Property Review, August, 2014, Vol.36(8), p.518-524. 
51 I.e. the provision found in the 1989-Directive Article 5(1)(a). According to Recital 11 the protection in 
such instances is “absolute”. However, the CJEU has consistently made it clear that protection under 
this rule is limited to instances in which a third party’s use of the sign affects or is liable to affect the 
functions of the trademark, L’Óreál ibid. with further references. In this way the protection is made 
conditional on the effect on a function and is not ‘absolute’.  
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have arguably left trademark holders with amble and strong arguments for further 
pushing the development their way.  
To sum up this very brief overview of EU trademark law, the development in the case 
law of the CJEU based on the legal reforms in the 1980’s and 90’ was an overall 
tendency for the Court to further the internal market and the economic effects of 
trademark and to develop the law primarily with a view to the interests of incumbent 
trademark holders. Importantly, the expansion in terms of the arms of the trademark 
holders was not matched by a similar development in terms of the arms of the users 
(private and/or commercial). Till the recent amendments (infra), the catalogue of 
limitations and exceptions had not been touched. It was against this basis that when 
the trademark system of EU was being reformed a call was issued for a new e 
limitation infrastructure that could ensure a balanced application of resulting norms 
in the future vis-à-vis the societal interests in freedom of expression and competition.52  
4. The New EU Trademark Rules 
For the present purposes the most important (but not the only see infra) novelty is the 
following Recital in the Preamble of the new EU trademark Regulation53: 
“(21) The exclusive rights conferred by an EU trademark should not entitle the proprietor to prohibit 
the use of signs or indications by third parties which are used fairly and thus in accordance with honest 
practices in industrial and commercial matters. In order to create equal conditions for trade names and 
EU trademarks in the event of conflicts, given that trade names are regularly granted unrestricted 
protection against later trademarks, such use should be only considered to include the use of the 
personal name of the third party. It should further permit the use of descriptive or non-distinctive signs 
or indications in general. Furthermore, the proprietor should not be entitled to prevent the fair and 
honest use of the EU trademark for the purpose of identifying or referring to the goods or services as 
those of the proprietor. Use of a trademark by third parties to draw the consumer's attention to the 
resale of genuine goods that were originally sold by or with the consent of the proprietor of the EU 
trademark in the Union should be considered as being fair as long as it is at the same time in 
accordance with honest practices in industrial and commercial matters. Use of a trademark by third 
parties for the purpose of artistic expression should be considered as being fair as long as it is at the 
same time in accordance with honest practices in industrial and commercial matters. Furthermore, this 
                                                          
52 Senftleben et al. (including this author), supra note 4 
53 A similar provision is found in the new Directive, point 27. The 1989-Directive did not include a 
similar wording. Instead, it contained a provision in Recital 7 that the EU rules does not “exclude the 
application to trademarks of provisions of law of the Member States other than trademark law, such as 
the provisions relating to unfair competition, civil liability or consumer protection”. Even though not 
excluding the application of provisions of fundamental rights such as free speech such interests are 
clearly not on the mind of the drafters of this Recital. The 2015-Directive should be fully implemented 
on January 15 2019 see article 54 and 55. Since the Regulation entered into force already on March 23 
2016 the legal situation is a bit schizophrenic until the Directive has been put into effect. One would 
expect national courts, however, to pay very close attention to the Regulation since the rules and 
provisions there will soon become effective regarding national trademarks too.  
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Regulation should be applied in a way that ensures full respect for fundamental rights and freedoms, 
and in particular the freedom of expression.” (emphasis added) 
The process which eventually led to the adoption of the new Regulation and Directive 
in December 2015, began in 2009 when the EU Commission initiated a review of the 
EU trademark system.54 Since it was concluded that existing system had been 
performing well no need for major revisions was identified, it became the purpose of 
the reform to make the well-known system more effective and user-friendly. Following 
this, a first proposal was published in 2009.55 The references to fundamental rights 
(and artistic expression) now found in Recital 21 of the Trademark Regulation were 
not included in the original proposal. Instead, they were introduced late in the 
legislative process and without much further ado. In fact, the provision has hardly left 
any trace at all and very little interpretative aid can been found in the traveaux 
préparotoire. The important MPI-Study, which was commissioned by the Commission 
and contains an extensive study of the trademark rules including a comprehensive 
stakeholder analysis did not foresee any mentioning of fundamental rights.56 Nor did 
the 2009 and 2013 Commission proposals, which aimed only at certain uses within the 
traditional framework of trademark law and the overarching concept of “honest 
practices in industrial and commercial matters”. This included a new limitation on 
referential use (which was eventually adopted, see infra) but contained no reference to 
fundamental rights (nor to artistic use).57 A suggestion to add fundamental rights and 
freedoms was first made by the Committee on Legal Affairs58 and later backed up by 
the Committee on the Internal Market and Consumer Protection59. In its first reading 
of the 25th of February 2014, the European Parliament suggested to incorporate these 
concerns via an express limitation aimed at parody, artistic expression, criticism or 
                                                          
54 Overview at http://ec.europa.eu/growth/industry/intellectual-property/trade-mark-protection_en. 
55 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Council 
Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 on the Community trademark,  COM/2013/0161 final - 2013/0088 (COD).  
56 Study on the Overall Functioning of the European Trademark System presented by Max Planck 
Institute for Intellectual Property and Competition Law, Munich 15.02.2011, point 2.252 (the MPI-
Study). The Study is available e.g. at http://ec.europa.eu/growth/industry/intellectual-property/trade-
mark-protection_en 
57 2009 Proposal and European Commission, 2013/0088 (COD), COM (2013), 161 final, 27 March 2013, 
p. 9, Recital (21): The exclusive rights conferred by a European trademark should not entitle the 
proprietor to prohibit the use of signs or indications which are used fairly and in accordance with honest 
practices in industrial and commercial matters. In order to create equal conditions for trade names and 
trademarks in case of conflicts against the background that trade names are regularly granted 
unrestricted protection against later trademarks, such use should be considered to include the use of 
one’s own personal name only. It should further include the use of descriptive or non-distinctive signs or 
indications in general. Moreover, the proprietor should not be entitled to prevent the general fair and 
honest use of the European trademark for identifying or referring to the goods or services as those of 
the proprietor.” 
58 European Parliament (Committee on Legal Affairs), Amendments 71-189, 2013/0088 (COD), 31 
October 2013, p. 5-7. 
59 European Parliament (Committee on the Internal Market and Consumer Protection), Opinion, 
2013/0088 (COD), 07 November 2013, p. 7. 
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comment.60 In the subsequent process, however, this suggestion was not followed. 
Instead it was agreed to amend the recitals and insert the wording mentioned supra 
and to not address the matter directly in the substantive provisions.61  
Recital 21 covers a number of different issues and topics, which all have in common 
that they aim to indicate limits for trademark exclusivity. In this way, the Recital 
could be seen as answering the call mentioned supra for a stronger limitations 
infrastructure to match the expansion of trademark law. The first part of the Recital  
subjects provides for limitations but only to the extent that the use by third parties is 
fair and in accordance with honest practices. The application of fundamental rights 
and freedoms is not, however, made subject to the “fair and honest practices-”test. 
Instead, this part constitutes a freestanding test. This is also the effect of the use of 
the opening word – “furthermore” – and by the adjective “full respect”. These interests 
should be taken into account when applying any rule or principle of trademark law 
(see more infra) including the definition of which uses are “fair” and in conformity 
with “honest practices”.  
4.1. The constitutionalization of trademark law 
The new Recitals in the Preamble on fundamental rights confirm and reflect a general 
trend of constitutionalization of IPR in EU-law. As described supra this process 
involves a more direct involvement of constitutional norms in the interpretation and 
application of IPR than previously known. Furthermore, Geiger also points out, how a 
constitutional dimension would enable (perhaps even force) courts to integrate 
concerns and values which have not been expressed directly in the traditional IPR 
analysis and to aim for the general societal well-being and appropriate balance 
between different interests.62 Apart from confirming that trade mark law is part of 
this overall trend, it is submitted that the active step of internalizing fundamental 
rights into trademark by the new Recitals is going to accelerate the processes 
identified by Geiger. This is not going to revolutionize EU trade mark law. As 
explained supra the well know rules and principles remain in force and the 
constitutionalization does not require contra legem interpretations by courts. Nor does 
the development detract the societal value of trademark protection or dimish the 
importance of fair and honest commercial practices. The constitutionalization does, 
however, open the door for new arguments and perspective in trade mark cases. 
Furthermore, the explicit internalization of those norms could well leap-frog any 
hesitations following from the traditional external/internal view described supra. The 
                                                          
60 European Parliament, Text adopted by the Parliament, 1st reading/single reading, 2013/0088 (COD), 
25 February 2014, point 14. 
61 Council of the European Union, Statement of the Council’s reasons, 2013/0088 (COD), 10373/1/15 
REV 1 ADD 1, p. 6-7 and European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European 
Parliament, 2013/0088 (COD), COM (2015), 589 final, p. 4. 
62 Geiger supra note 4, 371. 
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effect on national courts will come in part via the CJEU63 and in part via the national 
implementation. In both instances courts are going to rely on the preamble to cast 
light on the interpretation of a legal rule.64 For courts such as Danish ones which have 
traditionally been reluctant to rely on arguments derived from fundamental rights 
this will no doubt make the application of free speech arguments etc. more accessible 
than previously. 
4.1.1. The example of copyright  
The CJEU has dealt with IPR and Fundamental Rights in number of judgments. Till 
now, most of these have concerned copyright.65 In the following, I’ll mentioned only 
some examples.66 Even though copyright cases are arguably more prone to arguments 
based on free speech because of copyright’s subject matter one would expect the 
general principles developed by the CJEU to apply even to trademark law.  
                                                          
63 National courts are obliged to refer preliminary questions to the CJEU when in doubt on the 
interpretation of EU law, TFEU article 267 and previous decisions are binding on national courts. 
64 E.g. Judgment of the CJEU of 13 July 1989, Case C-215/88, Casa Fleischhandels-GmbH v 
Bundesanstalt für landwirtschaftliche Marktordnung ECLI:EU:C:1989:331 para 31.  
65 See most notably Judgment of the CJEU of 12 September 2006, Case C-479/04, Laserdisken ApS v 
Kulturministeriet, ECLI:EU:C:2006:549; Judgment of the CJEU of 29 January 2008, Case C-275/06, 
Productores de Música de España (Promusicae) v Telefónica de España SAU, ECLI:EU:C:2008:54; 
Judgement of the CJEU of 24 November 2011, Case C-70/10, Scarlet Extended SA v Société belge des 
auteurs, compositeurs et éditeurs SCRL (SABAM), ECLI:EU:C:2011:771; Judgement of the CJEU 1 
December 2011, Case C-145/10, Eva-Maria Painer v Standard Verlags GmbH and Others, 
ECLI:EU:C:2011:798; Judgement of the CJEU of 9 February 2012, Case C-277/10, Martin Luksan v 
Petrus van der Let, ECLI:EU:C:2012:65; Judgement of the CJEU of 16 February 2012, Case C-360/10, 
Belgische Vereniging van Auteurs, Componisten en Uitgevers CVBA (SABAM) v Netlog NV, 
ECLI:EU:C:2012:85; Judgement of the CJEU 15 November 2012, Case C-180/11, Bericap 
Záródástechnikai Bt. v Plastinnova 2000 Kft., ECLI:EU:C:2012:717; Judgement of the CJEU of 22 
January 2013, Case C-283/11, Sky Österreich GmbH v Österreichischer Rundfunk, ECLI:EU:C:2013:28; 
Judgement of the CJEU of 27 June 2013, Case C-457 and C-460/11, Verwertungsgesellschaft Wort (VG 
Wort) v Kyocera and Others (C-457-11) and Canon Deutschland GmbH (C-458/11), and Fujitsu 
Technology Solutions GmbH (C-459/11) and Hewlett-Packard GmbH (C-460/11) v 
Verwertungsgesellschaft Wort (VG Wort), ECLI:EU:C:2013:426; Judgement of the CJEU of 27 March 
2014, Case C-314/12, UPC Telekabel Wien GmbH v Constantin Film Verleih GmbH and Wega 
Filmproduktionsgesellschaft mbH, ECLI:EU:C:2014:192; and Judgement of the CJEU of 3 September 
2014, Case C-201/13, Johan Deckmyn and Vrijheidsfonds VZW v Helena Vandersteen and Others, 
ECLI:EU:C:2014:2132. For in-depth analysis and for a (then) full-history account see Mylly, supra note 
4. 
66 As a notable example of the general character of the constitutionalization, the Judgment of the CJEU 
of 16 July 2015, Case C-170/13, Huawei Technologies v ZTE Corp and ZTE Deutschland, 
ECLI:EU:C:2015:477, on competition law and standard essential patents indicated as a starting point 
for its analysis that a balance should be struck between maintaining free competition and the 
requirement to safeguard that proprietor’s intellectual-property rights guaranteed by Article 17(2), para 
57. 
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In 2006, the CJEU found in Laserdisken that a provision which restricted parallel 
importation from third countries of copyright protected material including movies67 
did not violate the principle of freedom of expression. In so finding the Court explained 
that the rule does not prevent copyright holders from communicating their ideas but 
rather to control the first marketing of the object protected by the right (point 63). The 
important point as seen from a constitutional perspective is not the actual result but 
the way the CJEU framed its assessment of the validity of the exhaustion rule under 
the general balancing principle established by ECHR Article 10 on Freedom of 
expression.68 In this way the Court not only implicitly accepted the relevance of that 
provision for the evaluation of the provision in copyright. By way of inference it also 
accepted that it might have found the provision in the Directive to be unjustified in 
the light of the balancing principle contained in Article 10. The Court in this way 
recognised at least in principle69  that it would be able to use the (external) 
fundamental right (in casu the ECHR Article 10) to second guess the (internal) 
balancing of the copyright legal instrument. In Promusicae70 from 2008, the Court 
found that the EU-rules only impose limited obligations on Internet Service Providers 
(ISPs) to communicate personal data in order to ensure effective protection of 
copyright. The CJEU explained that the case raised the need to reconcile different 
fundamental rights, viz. the right to respect for private life on the one hand (i.e. EU 
Charter Article 8) and the rights to protection of property (i.e. EU Charter Article 17) 
and to an effective remedy (i.e. EU Charter Article 47) (para 65). To reconcile those 
interests, the CJEU instructed national courts to ”take care to rely on an 
interpretation of the directives which allows a fair balance to be struck between the 
various fundamental rights protected by the Community legal order” (para. 68 italics 
added). In particular courts should not just interpret national laws in a manner 
                                                          
67  The rules on exhaustion in Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 
May 2001 on the harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information 
society [2001] OJ L 167/10, article 4. 
68 Which reads: “1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to 
hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority 
and regardless of frontiers. This Article shall not prevent States from requiring the licensing of 
broadcasting, television or cinema enterprises. 2. The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it 
duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as 
are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, 
territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health 
or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of 
information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary”. 
69 On the other hand, unlike the Advocate General in the case, Opinion of Advocate General Sharpston 
delivered on 4 May 2006 points 65-71, the Court never engaged in any substantive discussion but 
simply stated that “the alleged restriction on the freedom to receive information is justified in the light 
of the need to protect intellectual property rights” (point 65). According to Mylly, supra note 4, 
Laserdisken represents the “culmination of the rejection and ignorance period [of the CJEU] in IP 
matters”. 
70 Supra note 65. 
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consistent with EU-directives. They should also make sure that they do not rely on an 
interpretation of them “which would be in conflict with those fundamental rights or 
with the other general principles of Community law, such as the principle of 
proportionality …” (para 68). Not only is the balancing test and the principle of 
proportionality introduced as the basic way of reconciling the different interests. The 
balancing test should, furthermore, be applied in a way which makes it clear that the 
need to secure the “effective protection of copyright” (i.e. the fundamental right to 
property (para 62)) does not trump the interests inherent in protecting the 
communication of personal data (i.e. the fundamental right to effective judicial 
protection (para 62) and the protection of personal data and of private life (para 63)). 
Safeguarding copyright as a fundamental right in other words does not take priority 
but is just one interest amongst other equally important interests. Next, in 2011 in 
Scarlet Extended71 the Court rejected that the EU-rules on enforcement of copyright 
vis-à-vis ISPs require them to install all-encompassing filtering systems. The CJEU 
remarked i.a. that  
“The protection of the right to intellectual property is indeed enshrined in Article 17(2) of the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union (‘the Charter’). There is, however, nothing whatsoever in 
the wording of that provision or in the Court’s case-law to suggest that that right is inviolable and must 
for that reason be absolutely protected” (para 43. Italics added).  
Instead the protection of the fundamental right to property, which includes the rights 
linked to intellectual property, must be balanced against the protection of other 
fundamental rights (para 44) with a view of striking “a fair balance between the 
protection of copyright and the protection of the fundamental rights of individuals who 
are affected by such measures” (para 45). The latter includes the freedom to conduct a 
business enjoyed by operators such as ISPs pursuant to Article 16 of the Charter (para 
46). In UPC Telekabel72 from 2014, the CJEU explained that in deciding whether or 
not to grant injunctions prohibiting ISPs from allowing customers access to web-sites 
containing copyright infringing material national courts should balance the involved 
interests as these have been expressed though the rules on fundamental rights and 
other general principles such as the principle of proportionality (para 46). As 
explained in Scarlet, those interests include Article 16 which according to the Court 
includes i.a. “the right for any business to be able to freely use, within the limits of its 
liability for its own acts, the economic, technical and financial resources available to 
it” (para 49).73 Consequently, an injunction which impose grave costs or impose other 
disproportional burdens on IPSs would not be justified (para 52 and 53). Furthermore, 
the Court explained that an IPS in choosing the measures to be adopted in order to 
                                                          
71 Supra note 65.  
72 Supra note 65.  
73 Generally G Ghidini and A Stazi, Freedom to conduct a business, competition and intellectual 
property”, 410 – 420 in Geiger C (ed.) supra note 4.  
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comply with an injunction should include the interests of the users in using the 
provider’s services in order to ”lawfully access information” (para 56). Failing to take 
the interests into account as part of the balancing would, the Court explained, not 
take due account of the “freedom of information” of the users (ibid.). The national court 
must check that these limits are respected (para 57). Remarkably the CJEU here 
relies on the fundamental right of freedom of information to impose obligations on a 
private party (the ISP) vis-a-vis another private party (the user). Finally yet 
importantly in 2014 in Deckmyn74, the Court linked the existence of the exception on 
parodies in the Infosoc-Directive to the Charter. The Court explained that the 
exception should be interpreted in a way which enabled the effectiveness of the 
exception thereby established to be safeguarded (para 23)75 and which stroke a fair 
balance between, on the one hand, the interests and rights of right holders and, on the 
other, the freedom of expression of the user of a protected work who is relying on the 
exception for parody (para 27). 
As it can be seen, the CJEU in all these decisions in one way or the other factored 
arguments based on fundamental rights norms into the assessment of the legality or 
effects of the IP-legislation. In this way, the external fundamental rights norms have 
come to serve at the same time as legitimizing the IPR norms and as instruments of 
interpretation of the internal IPR rules. The central mechanism is the balancing of 
interests. As explained by Griffiths the term “balancing” should be understood merely 
as a metaphor for a process which involves a detailed exercise of comparison between 
the requirements of competing interests.76 Unlike in a traditional IPR analysis the 
constitutional balancing uses fundamental rights norms to frame the issues and as the 
basis for finding the relevant arguments.  As seen in this perspective, the weight on 
the right holder’s side of the scale is provided by the right to property (Article 17(2) of 
the Charter).77 On the other side of the scale one might find the right to freedom of 
expression (Article 11(1) of the Charter) or the freedom to conduct a business (Article 
16 of the Charter). Importantly, the right to freedom of expression and the freedom to 
conduct a business are based on a respect for the existence of IPR (to use the phrase 
coined by the CJEU, supra) but are available to legitimize and facilitate limitations in 
certain cases. The nature of the interests and their weights cannot, however, be 
gauged once and for all but must be determined through a case by case analysis. This 
open-endedness lies at the very heart of the test. Another part is the turning about of 
the base line for assessing which is the main rule (exclusivity or freedom of 
information) and which the limitation (injunction or access to use) as identified supra 
                                                          
74 Supra note 65. 
75 Similarly in Judgment of the CJEU of 10 November 2016, Case C-174/15, Vereniging Openbare 
Bibliotheken v Stichting Leenrecht, ECLI:EU:C:2016:856, para 51 (on the public lending limitation). 
76 Griffiths, supra note 4, 74. 
77 Ibid., 71 and Schovsbo supra note 22. 
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which makes any a priori assumption about a narrow or broad interpretation of the 
limitations problematic. Accepting balancing as the basis of a legal analysis is thus to 
accept that cases cannot be decided based on deduction or with reference alone to IPR-
systematic concerns.78 This is also the gist of the dictum in Scarlet that IPR is “not 
inviolable” and must not be “absolutely protected”.  
5. Impact assessment   
5.1. General  
The new Recitals have confirmed that trademark law is part of the broader trend of 
constitutionalization. For this reason, the principles developed by the CJEU in the 
copyright cases are applicable also to trademarks mutadis mutandis. The imediate 
effects of this will most likely not be dramatic. At the same time, however, the more 
pronounced role of constitutional norms in trademark law proper is most likely going 
to serve as a catalyst for trademark analysis simply by opening the normative space 
and forcing courts to hear new types of arguments in trademark cases.79  
The new Directive/Regulation introduced some minor changes in terms of the 
substantive provisions. Some of these changes aimed at bolstering protection e.g. in 
regard to goods in transit80 or to geographical indications.81 Others are pushing in an 
opposite direction and will likely benefit users of trademark protected products. Most 
notably a novel limitation for the purpose of identifying or referring to goods or 
services as those of the proprietor of that trademark was introduced.82 This limitation 
covers e.g. the use of a third party’s trademark for selling that party’s used goods or 
for selling parallel imported goods, i.e. the “double-identity-“situation.83 In the same 
vein, Recital 18 of the Directive now makes it clear that an infringement of a 
trademark can only be established if there is a finding that the infringing mark or sign 
                                                          
78 Schovsbo, supra note 22. 
79 The EU courts have also relied on provisions in the Charter in cases involving trademarks and 
procedural matters, e.g. Judgment of the General Court of 22 May 2012, case T-585/10, Aitic Penteo v 
OHIM, ECLI:EU:T:2012:251 (on the EU Charter Article 41(2)(c) on the obligation of the administration 
to give reasons for its decisions) and Judgment of the CJEU of 27 March 2014, Case C-530/12, OHIM v. 
National Lottery Commission, ECLI:EU:C:2014:186 (on EU Charter Art 47 on fair trial). I will 
disregard these decisions in the following and focus instead on substantive trademark law.  
80 Regulation Article 9(4). 
81 Regulation Article 8(4a). 
82 Regulation Article 12: “1. An EU trademark shall not entitle the proprietor to prohibit a third party 
from using, in the course of trade: … (c) the EU trademark for the purpose of identifying or referring to 
goods or services as those of the proprietor of that trademark, in particular, where the use of that 
trademark is necessary to indicate the intended purpose of a product or service, in particular as 
accessories or spare parts” (the original version read: “(c) the trademark where it is necessary to 
indicate the intended purpose of a product or service, in particular as accessories or spare parts”). 
Similarly Directive article 14.  
83 Directive article 10(2)(a) and Regulation article 9(2)(a). 
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is “used in the course of trade for the purposes of distinguishing goods or services”. 
The use of marks for – say – decorative purposes or the accidental use of a mark 
cannot constitute an infringement. 
5.1.1.1 Concrete issues 
Turning to the most likely concrete effects and the ability of the new trademark 
system to address some of the concerns raised, Martin Senftleben has made the 
following observation (before the adoption of the new provisions): 
“In the area of limitations of the scope of trademark protection, the analysis revealed that with the 
continuous expansion of trademark protection in the EU, inherent limits of exclusive rights become less 
and less reliable safe harbours for free speech. It has become more difficult to demarcate exactly the 
limits of actionable trademark use. Besides forms of use that would interfere with the essential 
trademark function of signalling the commercial origin of goods and services, EU trademark owners 
may also have success in invoking trademark rights against forms of use, such as criticism, comment 
and parody that do not impair the basic origin function, but may adversely affect brand image and 
goodwill. This expansion of trademark rights is likely to have an increasingly deterrent effect. The mere 
risk of being sued for trademark infringement because of a biting comment or parody may prevent users 
from engaging in these forms of free speech. To safeguard freedom of expression, it is thus advisable to 
reassure users of trademarked signs that certain forms of use are exempted from the control of the 
trademark owner by adopting appropriate exceptions that can be invoked as defences against alleged 
infringement. In this way, legal certainty can be re-established, and socially and culturally valuable use 
can be encouraged.”84 
Following this analysis, I will focus my assessment of the impact of the changes in 
relation to two issues i.e. 1) Demarcation of the limits of actionable trademark use and 
2) Limitations as safe harbors for fundamental rights.  
1) Demarcation of the limits of actionable trademark use 
Senftleben has noticed a deterrence effect arising from the actual or perceived ability 
of trademark holders to rely on the extended protection offered to marks with a 
reputation to successfully invoke trademark rights against forms of use, such as 
criticism, comment and parody that do not impair the basic origin function, but may 
adversely affect brand image and goodwill.  
The protection of marks with a reputation (or “well known marks”) did not change 
with the new rules. According to the Directive article 10(2)(c) (Regulation Article 
9(2)(c)) holders of such marks may thus still prevent the use of such marks where such 
use without due cause takes unfair advantage of, or is detrimental to, the distinctive 
character or the repute of the EU trademark.85  
The scope of the protection under EU law for marks with a reputation is very broad. 
Thus, in L’Oréal/Bellure the Court stated that taking unfair advantage covers, in 
                                                          
84 Senftleben supra note 4, 376 (footnote omitted). 
85 Unlike in the previous Directive the obligation in article 10 is now mandatory.  
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particular, “cases where, by reason of a transfer of the image of the mark or of the 
characteristics which it projects to the goods identified by the identical or similar sign, 
there is clear exploitation on the coat-tails of the mark with a reputation”.86 According 
to this test the burden of proof for finding infringement is very light.87 Arguably, the 
CJEU has so far limited the application of the “standing on the coattail-“test to cases 
where imitations are offered for sale.88 This reading, however, is open to challenge and 
what remains is a broad and wide area for trademark holders to argue their case. For 
artists who include trade marks in artworks which are offered for sale or for partly 
commercial organizations such as Greenpeace who use trademarks or parodies to 
express criticism in ways which involve a commercial elements (e.g. the selling of T-
shirts) determining the scope of the coattail-test is complicated and may prevent even 
beneficial activities. Also commercial users who depend on e.g. rating or comparing 
companies or provide general information about products and rely on trade marks to 
identify those companies or products could find themselves liable to infringement suits 
even beyond the sphere where the use dilutes or harms the trademarks in question. 
In light of the potential broadness of the scope of the protection for well-known marks 
Di Cataldo has pointed to the importance of the balancing potential of the without due 
cause-criterion both in limiting the scope of protection and in making it clear that the 
limitations also apply for marks with a reputation.89 If understood as a separate 
negative criterion, it may thus counterbalance the positive criteria in Article 10 (i.e. 
unfair advantage or detriment). The role and function of the ”due course” requirement 
is not clear. The German Supreme Court relied on this criterion for finding the use of 
a trademark as a parody to be legal in the light of the artistic freedom (the color 
purple used for Milka-chocolate and with a text which alluded ironically to the 
trademark).90 So far, however, the CJEU has not devoted much energy to develop this 
                                                          
86 Supra note 50, para. 41. Italics added. 
87 The burden for establishing that the use would be detrimental to the distinctive character of the 
earlier mark is higher, Judgment of the CJEU of 27 November 2008, case C-252/07, Intel Corporation v 
CPM United Kingdom, ECLI:EU:C:2008:655, para. 77 (requiring “evidence of a change in the economic 
behaviour of the average consumer of the goods or services for which the earlier mark was registered 
consequent on the use of the later mark, or a serious likelihood that such a change will occur in the 
future”).  
88 Judgment of the CJEU of 23 March 2010, Joined cases C-236/08, C-237/08 en C-238/08, Google 
France SARL and Google Inc. v Louis Vuitton Malletier SA (C-236/08), Google France SARL v Viaticum 
SA and Luteciel SARL (C-237/08) and Google France SARL v Centre national de recherche en relations 
humaines (CNRRH) SARL and Others (C-238/08), ECLI:EU:C:2010:159, para. 102 and 103.  
89 Di Cataldo V, The Trade Mark with a Reputation in EU Law – Some Remarks on the Negative 
Condition ‘Without Due Cause”, 2011 International Review of Intellectual Property and Competition 
Law 833-845. 
90 Judgment of the German Supreme Court of 3 February 2005, Case I ZR 159/02, (OLG Hamm) Lila-
Postkarte, ECLI:DE:BGH:2005:030205UIZR15902, Gewerblicher Rechtsschutz und Urheberrecht 2005, 
583 (with picture). Senftleben supra note 4, 364 points out that the court did in fact find the use to be 
capable of constituting an infringement so the “due course-“criterion was relied upon as a “last stop”. 
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part of the provision. In Interflora the CJEU recognized the use of someone else’s 
trademark to inform consumers about alternative offers in the market place as falling 
within the ambit of fair competition and to constitute a “due cause”. The acceptance 
was limited, however, to uses where the third party did not offer “mere imitations” or 
used the mark in ways that caused dilution or tarnishment or which adversely 
affected the functions of the trademark concerned.91 It is not clear from this decision 
whether the due cause-criterion is to be seen as a separate criterion or whether it is 
merely factored into the broader assessment of the admissibility of the use. A robust 
application of the undue cause requirement could help calm the concern one might 
have following L’Oréal/Bellure. It is submitted that the new Recitals are going to 
provide users with strong augments to persuade courts to consider the test as 
establishing a separate criterion.  
For the use of trademarks for the purpose of artistic expression the reference in the 
recitals is not backed up by any specific limitation. Therefore, courts are going to 
include this perspective via the overall test of infringement. The first step in such an 
analysis would be to consider whether or not the marks is used “as a mark” (i.e. “for 
the purposes of distinguishing goods or services” as it is now expressed in Recital 18). 
For marks which are used e.g. as part of a painting this would normally not be the 
case. Courts should also, however, take into account whether the use for the purpose 
of artistic expression is fair and in conformity with honest practices. If that is not the 
case, the artist would violate trademark law if there is a risk of confusion or (for well-
known marks) the use is taking unfair advantage of the mark or is detrimental. It is 
thus not any use for artistic purposes which should be exempted from trademark 
claims. In finding the boundaries, the mere existence of a commercial interest should 
arguably not bring the activity within the ambit of trade mark exclusivity. For 
instance putting a painting which uses a trademark as part of its motive on the 
market for sale should not bring it within reach of trademark law. In support for such 
a reading, courts are now able to rely on the last part of the Recital (supra). It would, 
therefore, most likely just be in those instances where a work of art containing a trade 
mark as an important part of the motive is used as merchandise or in other 
commercial and non-artistic ways that trademark protection would be triggered. 
Traditional analyses would lead to the same results92 but, the Recital is without any 
                                                          
91 Supra, note 45, para. 91: “By contrast, where the advertisement displayed on the internet on the 
basis of a keyword corresponding to a trademark with a reputation puts forward – without offering a 
mere imitation of the goods or services of the proprietor of that trademark, without causing dilution or 
tarnishment and without, moreover, adversely affecting the functions of the trademark concerned – an 
alternative to the goods or services of the proprietor of the trademark with a reputation, it must be 
concluded that such use falls, as a rule, within the ambit of fair competition in the sector for the goods 
or services concerned and is thus not without ‘due cause’ for the purposes of Article 5(2) of Directive 
89/104 and Article 9(1)(c) of Regulation No 40/94.” 
92 Senftleben, supra note 4, 363. 
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doubt going to make it easier for courts to draw the lines and to include the user’s 
interest in the assessment too.  
A constitutional reading with an accent on the freedom to conduct a business would 
arguably also make it easier for courts to asses in a comprehensive way which novel 
practices should be allowed for as being “inherent in competition”93 and which should 
be deem illegal. Some of these uses would fit well within the known categories e.g. the 
use of trademarks in comparative advertising.94 Other uses would be harder to access 
such as the use to identify products known only under the trade mark.95 Considering, 
however, the fast pace of innovation it is hard to foresee which novel kinds of uses may 
emerge. So far, many of the activities which have challenged trademark law – e.g. 
keywording, metatags, the use by on-line auctions sites etc. – have not relied 
trademarks as indications of commercial origin in the traditional sense but rather as 
fodder for the search engines. It hard to see why future uses would not continue to 
develop new was for trademarks to be used. In order for trademark law to keep up and 
to deliver legal solutions which strikes the right balance between the legitimate 
interest of the holder of rights in marks and of those marks flexibility is needed. The 
inclusion of the “freedom to conduct a business-”standard may well provide an 
important piece for finding that balance.96  
2) Limitations as safe harbours for fundamental rights  
Should courts also in trademark cases decide take their cue from the Deckmyn-decision  
in copyright (supra) one could expect that they would engage in an open minded 
discussion which recognizes the interests of users on the same level as those off 
trademark holders. This would imply a rejection of any a priori assumptions that 
limitations and exceptions should be construed narrowly and to the benefit of the 
trademark holder. This does not mean that courts would automatically interpret 
limitations in a pro user way. Instead, the new line of arguing would suggest that users’ 
interests should be recognize as being of a high ranking nature to the extent that are 
backed up by fundamental rights interests. This would cover not only free speech 
interest but arguably also commercial interests if access is necessary to engage in 
normal and fair commercial activity. For referential uses a new provision is now in place 
                                                          
93 Judgment in Interflora, supra note 45. 
94 The Directive article 10(2)(f) (the Regulation article 9(3)(f)) now makes it clear that it constitutes a 
trademark infringement to use a sign in comparative advertising in a manner that is contrary to 
Directive 2006/114/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2006 concerning 
misleading and comparative advertising, OJ L 376, 27.12.2006, p. 21. 
95 Di Cataldo, supra 839 et seq. (mentioning the Segway as an example) 
96 See in the same vein Riis T and Schovsbo J, Compulsory licences and trade marks, European 
Intellectual Property Review, Oct, 2012, Vol. 34(10), p. 651-653 arguing that access to use the trademark 
warrant the granting of a compulsory license to use the mark (if the origin function is not jeopardized).   
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and this is no doubt going to absorb some important concrete uses and make it clear 
that e.g. the use for used or parallel imported products is legal.   
Concretely one would expect the framing of the balancing of interest in Gillette 
(supra) to not be continued. Instead of measuring, the effects as seen from the 
perspective of the trademark holder only one would expect the CJEU and national 
courts to begin their balancing of interests with empty scales and to apply the 
criterion “honest practices” in an open-ended way.  
6. Final remarks 
 
As seen from a broader perspective the new Rrecitals have confirmed the development 
in case law from the CJEU of the overarching importance of fundamental rights to 
IPR and their close interrelationship the two areas of the law. The 
constitutionalization identified by Geiger as a means of reining in IPR protection and 
placing IPR it within a legal framework which focuses on the effects (i.e. costs) of the 
protection system as seen from a general societal perspective is now cast in stone. In 
terms of the application of trademark law the Recitals have clarified the existence of a 
two layer framework which combines open ended standards from fundamental rights 
with a catalogue of specific limitations. On the overall level this structure is 
recommendable as it combines flexibility and clarity to give the courts room of 
manoeuvre.97  
The new Recitals are not going to revolutionize EU-trademark. They are, however,  
going to have an effect even outside of the outlier cases where trademark law and 
fundamental rights come head to head. For those cases – which are important – the 
Recitals will provided clarity and help relive any freeze effects stemming from the 
practices of aggressive trademark holders. More generally, the inclusion of 
fundamental rights norms into trade mark legal analysis is going to provide courts 
and parties with a welcome opportunity to broaden the scope of the arguments to go 
beyond the traditional trademark values in undistorted competition and the free 
movement of goods. These values will continue to be important for future cases but it 
is now clear that they do not stand alone and that court should in drawing the line for 
what is actionable or not under trademark law should recognize users’ interests in 
access to use protected marks when appropriate. This will in turn most likely mean 
that the broad and open ended provisions of trademark law will become more 
important. In particular the provisions on due cause and on honest practices are very 
                                                          
97 Ramsey and Schovsbo, supra note 4 (pointing out i.a. that already under the existing 
“constitutionalization this is the model preferred by the EU an d that a similar position is emerging in 
US trademark law and recommending the approach on an international level).  
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susceptible to broader and value based arguments and are most likely going to relied 
upon in a more pronounced way in future case law. Even other open ended provisions 
such as the requirement that a sign must be “distinctive” is inviting arguments and 
one could well imagine that e.g. an argument that a certain sign has general 
importance as being of “cultural significance”98 could be backed up by claims base on 
fundamental rights that access to this sign should remain free to not unreasonable 
restrict free speech or commercial freedom. 
                                                          
98 Senftleben, supra note 4, 356 and 358 et seq. 
